Papse v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39861 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-8-2013
Papse v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39861
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Papse v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39861" (2013). Not Reported. 851.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/851
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LIVINGSTON J. PAPSE ) 
) No. 39861 
Petitioner-Appel I ant, ) 
) Bannock Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CV-2009-4955 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HONORABLE STEPHEN S. DUNN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




LIVINGSTON PAPSE SR. 
IDOC #17502 
SICI North Dorm 
PO Box 8509 
Boise, Id 83707 
PROSE 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
Papse Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
Dismissal Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Following 
An Evidentiary Hearing ......................................................................... 4 
A. Introduction ................................................................................ 4 
B. Standard Of Review .................................................................. .4 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Papse's 
Post-Conviction Relief Petition ................................................... 5 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 9 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) .................................................. 5 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ................................................................................. 5 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,839 P.2d 1215 (1992) .............................................. 4 
McKayv. State, 148 Idaho 567,225 P.3d 700 (2010) ..................................................... 6 
Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P .2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992) ...................................... 4 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) .............................................. 5 
Papse v. State, Docket No. 37446, 2011 Unpublished Op. No. 339 
(Idaho App., February 2, 2011) ................................................................... 4 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ..................................................................... 5 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) ...................................... 5 
Santobellov. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) ................................................................. 6 
State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 10 P.3d 756 (Ct. App. 2000) ........................................ 7 
State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) ................................ 5 
State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 206 P.3d 867 (Ct. App. 2009) .............................. 8 
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 77 P.3d 988 (2003) .................................................... 6, 8 
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2010) .................................................. 6 
State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608,903 P.2d 1305 (1995) ................................................ 6 
State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 896 P.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1995) ...................................... 7 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................... 5 
Vickv. State, 131 Idaho 121,952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998) ......................................... 5 
ii 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 ..................................................................................................... 1 
Idaho Code § 18-8005 ..................................................................................................... 1 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Livingston Papse, Sr., appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an 
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual background and procedural history of this case, as related by the 
district court, are as follows: 
On November 19, 2007, Petitioner was charged with Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 18-8004 
and 18-8005(5). On February 25, 2008, Papse entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge. On April 29, 2008, Papse was sentenced to a unified term of 
eight years, with four years fixed and four years indeterminate. On May 
28, 2008, Papse filed a Notice of Appeal ("Appeal") to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, asserting that the sentence was excessive. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence in an unpublished 
opinion filed on February 10, 2009. 
On December 11, 2009, Papse filed this Petition and Affidavit for 
Post-Conviction Relief ("Petition"). In summary, Papse asserts that 1) his 
guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given and 2) that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement. The Court issued its decision 
granting Papse's Fee Waiver, denying his Motion for the Appointment of 
Counsel, and giving Notice of Intent to Dismiss Papse's Petition on 
December 30, 2009. 
On January 13, 2010, Petitioner filed an Affidavit in Response to 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. In this affidavit Papse 
stated that he suffered from chronic alcoholism and that he was not able 
to answer the Court's questions truthfully during his guilty plea, but was 
only able to "parrot" back what his attorney had told him he must say to 
receive the plea agreement. Papse also stated that "had counsel not 
inproperly [sic] instructed me that the court was agreeable with the 
1 
sentencing agreement, I would have insisted on going to trial." Papse 
asked the Court to reconsider its earlier decisions on the motions to 
Appoint Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss his Petition for Post-
Conviction. 
The Court allowed the twenty days to expire before dismissing the 
Petition. During this period, but before issuing its decision, the Court 
again reviewed the file and the supplemental affidavit submitted by Papse. 
After carefully considering the updated file the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision And Order Dismissing Papse's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief. 
On February 12, 2010, Papse filed an appeal of this Court's 
Decision Dismissing his Petition. In an unpublished opinion filed February 
2, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed this Court's decision denying 
the appointment of counsel and summary dismissal of Papse's Petition, 
and remanded the case for further proceedings on these issues. 
(R., pp.3-5 (brackets original, footnotes omitted).) 
On remand, Papse was appointed conflict counsel and the district court held an 
evidentiary hearing. (R., p.5; see also Tr.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the district 
court gratuitously provided Papse notice of its intent to dismiss the petition for post-
conviction relief on the ground that Papse's guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently given. (R., pp.3-13.) More than 20 days later, after receiving Papse's 
response to its notice and finding that Papse presented no new or additional information 
that would justify reconsideration of its decision, the district court dismissed Papse's 
petition. (R., pp.21-22.) Papse filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.24-28.) 
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ISSUE 
Papse claims several issues on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, p.5.) The state 
consolidates these and rephrases the issue as: 
Has Papse failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Papse Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Papse filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief wherein he claimed that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that Papse's plea was voluntary and that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement. Papse v. State, Docket No. 37446, 2011 
Unpublished Op. No. 339 at 1-2 (Idaho App., February 2, 2011). Papse requested 
counsel. kl at 2. The district court denied counsel and dismissed Papse's petition. kl 
Papse appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded "so 
that Papse may present [his ineffective assistance of counsel claim] and the remainder 
of his post-conviction claims with the assistance of appointed counsel." Id at 4. 
On remand, the district court appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing. 
(R., p.5; see also Tr., p.4, Ls.4-16.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court 
dismissed Papse's petition. Papse has shown no error in that dismissal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). Where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Papse's Post-Conviction Relief Petition 
On remand, Papse alleged that his attorney was ineffective in ensuring that 
Papse's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-22.) Where 
the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, 
he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To show 
deficient performance, the petitioner must "overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating 'that counsel's representation 
did not meet objective standards of competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121,124, 
952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 
873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 1994). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel 
without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-
470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). When the alleged 
deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations 
omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
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In its "Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the district 
court articulated the applicable legal standards and set forth the reasons Papse failed to 
show a material issue of fact upon which relief could be granted, even after an 
evidentiary hearing. 1 (See R., pp.3-13.) The state adopts as part of its argument on 
appeal the district court's reasoning for its dismissal, as set forth at pages 6-11 of its 
order, a copy of which is attached hereto as "Appendix A." 
On appeal, Papse also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct or 
breached his plea agreement by "failing to remain silent after citing plea to the court." 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) The record affirmatively disproves any claim that the prosecutor 
breached the plea agreement. 
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law 
standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 223 P.3d 750, 759 (2010). In making 
a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement, the state is bound to 
honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently with the terms of the 
agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971 ); State v. Lankford, 127 
Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995). The burden is on the defendant to show that the 
prosecutor's overall argument disavowed or was fundamentally at odds with the position 
the state was obligated to take pursuant to the plea agreement. See Lankford, 127 
Idaho at 617, 903 P.2d at 1314; State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 
(2003). Consistent with this standard, the state's recommendation may include 
1 Though the district court was only required to find that Papse failed to prove his 
claims under the preponderance of evidence standard, See McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010), it appears the court applied the more stringent 
material fact standard. However, because Papse failed to show after his evidentiary 
hearing that there was any material fact upon which relief could be granted, he also 
failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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information that is unfavorable to the defendant if the information is relevant to the 
court's sentencing determination, and may remind the court of the applicable legal 
standards. See State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 810, 10 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(discussion of findings contained in the presentencing psychosexual evaluation does 
not constitute breach of a plea agreement); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 
P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Unless the State has specifically agreed to the contrary, 
the prosecutor may legitimately refer to information relevant to the sentencing 
determination and may permissibly refer to the objectives of sentencing."). 
The express terms of the plea agreement in this case are unambiguously set 
forth in the record: Papse agreed to plead guilty to the charge in exchange for the 
state's recommendation that he serve a unified sentence of four years with two years 
fixed. (6/24/2008 Tr.,2 p.8, Ls.10-17.) No other promises were made, and Papse 
understood that the court was not bound by the recommendations of either party. 
(6/24/2008 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-20; p.19, L.5-p.20, L.5.) 
The prosecutor honored the letter of the agreement by recommending the agreed 
upon sentence of four years with two years fixed. (Sentencing Tr.,3 p.33, Ls.10-15.) 
The prosecutor's brief comments were also consistent with the plea agreement. At 
sentencing, Papse's trial counsel requested that the court consider placing Papse on 
probation. (Sentencing Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32., L.3.) But the prosecutor was not bound 
to a recommendation for probation; he agreed to recommend incarceration. (6/24/2008 
2 The 6/24/2008 Tr. is included in the appellate record of docket no. 37446, of which 
the Court took notice on this appeal, at pages 15-20. 
3 The Sentencing Tr. is included in the appellate record of docket no. 37446 at pages 
20-23. 
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Tr., p.8, Ls.10-17.) Therefore, responding to Papse's argument in favor of probation, 
the prosecutor briefly noted Papse's lengthy criminal history to explain why "prison [was] 
the only alternative in this case." (Sentencing Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.33, L.15.) Pointing out 
that a prison sentence was appropriate did not undermine the agreed upon sentencing 
recommendation of prison, but properly buttressed it against defense counsel's 
recommendation for probation. See State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 166-68, 206 
P.3d 867, 872-74 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's vigorous argument and reference to 
facts of crimes did not undermine or impliedly disavow sentencing recommendation, but 
properly buttressed it against any argument from defense counsel that a lesser 
sentence was warranted). 
Nor did the prosecutor undermine the promised recommendation of incarceration 
by making it "with great enthusiasm." (Sentencing Tr., p.33, Ls.12-13.) A prosecutor's 
"obligation to recommend a sentence promised in a plea agreement does not carry with 
it the obligation to make the recommendation enthusiastically." Jones, 139 Idaho at 
302, 77 P.3d at 991. However, a prosecutor certainly does not breach the plea 
agreement by making the agreed upon recommendation enthusiastically when rebutting 
an argument for a lesser sentence such as a request for probation. See Halbesleben, 
147 Idaho at 166-68, 206 P.3d at 872-74. The prosecutor therefore did not breach the 
plea agreement. 
Though he was appointed counsel and offered an opportunity to present his 
claims in an evidentiary hearing, Papse still failed to show that he was entitled to any 
post-conviction relief. The district court's order, dismissing Papse's post-conviction 
petition following the evidentiary hearing, should be affirmed. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal, 
following an evidentiary hearing, of Papse's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2013. 
?~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of July, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing a copy in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
LIVINGSTON PAPSE, SR 
IDOC #17502 
SICI North Dorm 
PO Box 8509 
Boise, Id 83707 
RJS/pm 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Case No. CV-2009-4955-PC 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
This matter is before the Court on the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief 
("Petition") filed by Petitioner Livingston J. Papse ("Papse" or "Petitioner"). The Court bas 
considered the Petition, the Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post Conviction Relief("Affidavitj, 
the evidence and oral arguments made during the evidentiary hearing, ·and the applicable law. 
After careful review, the Court gives Notice of Intent to dismiss Papse's Petition. 
BACKGROUND 
On November 19, 2007, Petitoner was charged with Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(5). On February 25, 
2008, Papse entered a plea of guilty to the charge. On April 29, 2008, Papse was sentenced to a 
unified term of eight years, with four years fixed and four years indeterminate. On May 28, 
2008, Papse filed a Notice of Appeal ("Appealj to the Idaho Supreme Court, asserting that the 




sentence was excessive. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence in 
an unpublished opinion filed on February 10, 2009. 
On May 28, 2008, Papse also filed an initial Rule 35 Motion asking this Court for a 
reduction in the sentence imposed upon him, on the grounds of leniency. On November 4, 2008, 
the Court denied Papse's Rule 35 Motion. Although the Rule 35 Motion is not mentioned in the 
unpublished decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals, that decision is a confirmation that this 
Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. 
On September 8, 2009, Papse, acting prose, filed a second Rule 35 Motion to Correct an 
Illegal Sentence ("Motion"). That Motion was denied on or about December 17, 2009, because 
the Court found that Petitioner's claims were without merit 
On December 11, 2009, Papse filed this Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief 
("Petition"). In summary, Papse asserts that I) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
given and 2) that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement 1 The Court issued its decision 
granting Papse's Fee Waiver, denying his Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, and giving 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Papse's Petition on December 30, 2009.2 
On January 13, 2010, Petitioner filed an Affidavit in Response to the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order. In this affidavit Papse stated that he suffered from chronic 
alcoholism and that he was not able to answer the Court's questions truthfully during his guilty 
plea, but was only able to "parrot" back what his attorney had told him he must say to receive the 
plea agreement.3 Papse also stated that "had counsel not inproperly [sic] instructed me that the 
1 Petition, pp. 2, 2A. 
2 Memorandum Decision and Order, December 31, 2009. 
3 Affidavit In Response To Memorandum Decision And Order On Papse's Motions And Notice Of Intent to 
Dismiss, January 13, 2010. 




court was agreeable with the sentencing agreement, I would have insisted on going to trial. "4 
Papse asked the Court to reconsider its earlier decisions on the motions to Appoint Counsel and 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss his Petition for Post-Conviction.5 
The Court allowed the twenty days to expire before dismissing the Petition. 6 During this 
period, but before issuing its decision, the Court again reviewed the file and the supplemental 
affidavit submitted by Papse. After carefully considering the updated file the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision And Order Dismissing Papse's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.7 
On February 12, 2010, Papse filed an appeal of this Court's Decision Dismissing his 
Petition. In an unpublished opinion filed February 2, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed 
this Court's decision denying the appointment of counsel and summary dismissal of Papse's 
Petition, and remanded the case for further proceedings on these issues. 8 
On March 10, 2011, this Court ordered a conflict public defender be appointed to 
represent Papse.9 Stephen Larsen was appointed to be Papse's counsel and motioned the Court 
to set a date for a hearing on the issue of whether or not Papse's plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 10 This hearing was held on January 30, 2012. During the hearing Papse's 
former counsel, John Dewey, testified to his recollection of the circumstances surrounding 
Papse's guilty plea Dewey testified that when he went over the guilty plea questionnaire with 
Papse that it took longer than normal because Papse had questions and he wanted to make sure 
he understood what was happening. Dewey also testified that he explained to Papse and that 
4 Affidavit In Response To Memorandum Decision And Order On Papse's Motions And Notice Of Intent to 
Dismiss, January 13, 2010, -ii 12, p. 3. 
5 Affidavit In Response To Memorandum Decision And Order On Papse's MotiODS And Notice Oflntent to 
Dismiss, January 13, 2010, p. 3. 
6 See Memorandum Decision And Order Dismissing Petition For Post-Conviction Relief; February 2, 2010. 
7 Memorandum Decision And Order Dismissing Petition For Post-Conviction Relief; February 2, 2010. 
1 Papse v. ldalw, Idaho Docket No. 37446, Unpublished Opinion No. 339, tiled February 2, 2011. 
9 Order, March 11, 2011. 
10 Motion for Hearing, March 22, 2011. 




Papse understood that the judge was not bound by th~ tenns of the plea agreement. Papse also 
testified and admitted that he knew what he was pleading guilty to, but complained only that he 
did not receive the sentence he believed he would receive, i.e., two years fixed and two years 
indeterminate. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court now issues its decision and again gives Papse Notice of Intent to Dismiss his 
Petition. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) are civil in 
nature. 11 The petitioner must prove the allegations giving rise to the application by a 
preponderance of evidence. 12 The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. 13 The 
application must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
petitioner.14 A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but not 
the petitioner's conclusions. 15 A petitioner is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been 
raised on a direct appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not 
have reasonably been known at the time of the appeal.16 Similarly, the petitioner may not 
relitigate the same issues that were already presented on a direct appeal. 17 
11 Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). 
12 Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24,995 P.2d 794 (2000). 
13 Id 
14 J.C. § 19-4903. 
15 Ferrier v. State, 13S Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
16 Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924, 925 (2001). 
17 Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002). 




When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial 
court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. 18 Summary 
disposition of a petition is appropriate if the petitioner's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact. 19 Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when ( 1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter oflaw.20 However, "[s]ummary dismissal of an application forpost-
conviction relief may be appropriate, ... , even where the state does not controvert the petitioner's 
evidence because the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw.,,21 
A petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the Strickland v. 
Washington test, which requires that the petitioner demonstrate both that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. 22 "A demonstration of deficient 
performance requires that the applicant's evidence overcome a strong presumption that trial 
counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.',23 To 
demonstrate prejudice, the applicant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the case would have been different 24 When a 
petitioner asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims "will survive a motion 
for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
18 Stuart, 118 Idaho 869,801 P.2d 1220 (1990)(citing Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho 542, 54S, S31 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(197S)). 
1~ I.C. § 19--4906(b), (c). 
20 Stuart, 118 Idaho 869, 801 P.2d 1220. 
21 State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 
61 P.2d 626,629 (CL App. 2003); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
22 McKeeth v, State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 103 P .3d 460, 463 (2004) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984)); State v. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 
~002). 
Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct App. 2000). See also McKeeth, 103 P.3d at 463. 
24 Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 51 P.3d at 792. 




whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) ~ material issue of fact exists as to whether 
the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case.n2S 
DISCUSSION 
I. Papse's guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. 
The Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective and acted without due diligence by 
instructing the Petitioner to answer the Court's Guilty Plea Questionnaire, both oral and written, 
in form and fashion for acceptance, without first making assurances that Petitioner had full, 
complete, knowing, and intelligent understanding and/or comprehension of the parameters 
governing guilty pleas, and the consequences. He also claims that he is undereducated and 
possesses a comprehension level disproportionate to his grade of education. Petitioner claims 
that the plea dialogue in the underlying criminal proceeding is riddled with testimony indicative 
of his confusion and incomprehension and that counsel knowingly disregarded this. He alleges 
that every time he was unsure of what he was required to say in court, that his attorney advised 
him to parrot counsel's answer. He claims that counsel's lack of attentiveness to Petitioner's 
low-level of comprehension and alcoholic stupor and/or counsel's use of the same to bamboozle 
Petitioner into pleading guilty worked to deny Petitioner his Federal Constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
The UPCP A provides that ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid claim for Post-
Conviction Relief. 26 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim the petitioner must 
satisfy both parts of the two-part Strickland test27 First, the petitioner must show that when 
judged objectively counsel's representation failed to meet reasonable and typical professional 
25 Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602,604, 21 P.3d 924,926 (2001); Gilpin-Grub, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. 
26 Murray v. State. 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P 2d 1323. 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). 
27 McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 8S0 103 P .3d 460, 463 (2004) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)); Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 80, 57 P.3d at 791. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER-6 
Case CV-2009-49S5-PC 
• • 
norms. 28 The petitioner must overcome the "strong presumption that trial counsel's performance 
fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. n29 Second, if the representation 
failed to meet the reasonable and typical professional norms, the petitioner must show that the 
result would have been different if counsel's representation had not been ineffective.30 To 
demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsePs unprofessional errors, the outcome of the case would have been different31 
When a petitioner asserts claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims "will 
survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact 
exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists 
as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case.',32 In addition, the constitutional 
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who 
can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried better.33 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
When a guilty plea is entered upon the advice of counse~ "the voluntariness of the plea 
depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases."' In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement for such an 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial. ,,34 
In this case the record and Papse's previous counsel's testimony indicate that his plea was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. The record reflects that Papse indicated to the 
Court, before changing his plea to guilty, that he had not taken any alcohol, drug, or medication 
28 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
29 Milburn, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2000). 
30 Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 
31 Gilpin-Grubb, 138 ldabo at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. 
32 Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 604, 21 P.3d at 926; Gilpir,.-Gruh, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. 
33 State v. Ivey, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P .2d 706, 709 (1992). 
34 Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002) (citations omitted). 




within the last 48 hours.35 Also, at Petitioner's Change of Plea Hearing, the following dialogue 
took place between the Court and the Defendant: 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there - does your alcohol addiction make it difficult for you to 
talk to me here in open court today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Does it make it difficult for you to understand anything that we're doing 
here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir. 
THE COURT: Have you taken any alcohol, drug, or medication within the last 48 hours? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. Sir. 
THE COURT: Any prescribed medication? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir. 
THE COURT: Any over-the-counter medication? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir. 
THE COURT: In your opinion, have you been adequately and competently represented 
by your lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.36 
Papse's claims that he was unable to understand or comprehend the proceedings of 
changing his plea are contradicted by not only his responses on his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, 
but also his responses to the presiding judge in open court. Additionally, during the recently held 
hearing Dewey testified that he spent a longer than average time explaining to Papse the plea 
agreement and answering his questions. Dewey testified that be explained the process to change 
Papse's plea, the terms of the plea deal, and that only the Court could guarantee a sentence. 
Dewey also testified that this discussion took longer than normal, but at its conclusion Papse 
understood the process of changing his plea and the ramifications of doing so. Papse did not 
contradict any of these statements with his testimony at the hearing. However, if there was any 
failure by Papse' s attorney to recognize his alleged alcoholic stupor or low level of 
comprehension it was a harmless error because of the multiple opportunities provi(ied to Papse, 
35 Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Question No. 6, attached as an exhtbit to Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
36 TR, pp. 15-16. 
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prior to the Court accepting the change of plea, to indicate to the Court that he did not understand 
or that he was under the influence of alcohol. 
More importantly, Papse asserts that if his counsel had not "improperly instructed me that 
the court was agreeable with the sentencing agreement, I would have insisted on going to trial. tt37 
However, the record directly contradicts Papse's statement The Court had a very specific 
discussion with Papse about the fact that only the Court could do the sentencing and that the plea 
agreement was not binding on the Court. There is nothing about that discussion between the 
Court and Papse that suggests ineffective assistance of counsel or that Papse's alleged alcoholic 
stupor or low level of comprehension prevented him from understanding that only the Court 
could impose his sentence. Papse did not offer any testimony in the most recent hearing to 
suggest that he did not understand that the Court had the full discretion in sentencing and that it 
was possible for the Court to impose a sentence in excess of any recommendation. The Court 
concludes that both the Affidavit and the subsequent hearing failed to show any meaningful new 
or additional information that would prevent the Court from again issuing a Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss the Petition. Therefore, Papse has failed to prove his trial attorney was ineffective for 
failing to recognize his alleged low-level of comprehension and/or alcoholic stupor or that his 
pleas was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
Finally, Papse claims that his counsel advised him on several occasions that the Court 
was amenable to the plea agreement of two years fixed and two years indetenninate. 
In Petitioner's Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Petitioner is asked whether "any person 
promised you that you will receive any special sentence, reward, favorable treatment, or leniency 
with regard to the plea you are about to enter?" Petitioner responded by stating that "State will 
37 Affidavit, ,i 12. 




ask for 2 yrs Fixed + [plus] 2 yrs indeterminate. "38 The next question states, "Do you understand 
that the only person who can promise what sentence you actually receive is the Judge?" The 
Petitioner responded by marking "Yes. 039 Also, the next question asks, "Do you understand that 
the Judge is not required to follow the sentence recommended by either your attorney or the 
prosecutor? The Petitioner again responded by marking "Yes. ,,40 
Furthermore, the following dialogue occurred between Papse and the Court at his Change 
of Plea Hearing: 
THE COURT: Question 13 asks about any promises that have been made to you, and 
you've answered "yes," and it looks like there was a summary of your plea bargain 
agreement. Other than the promises made by the state as part of your plea bargain 
agreement, other than that, has anyone said to you that you might receive some special 
sentence, reward, favorable treatment, or leniency if you were to plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand that I'm the only one who can promise you what 
sentence it is that you'll actually receive. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And I'm not required to follow what may be recommended by your 
attorney or by the prosecuting attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And so I may do something different. It might be something that you 
don't expect. It might be something that you think is unfair. Even if that's what happens, 
you have no right to withdraw your guilty plea. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you okay with that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.41 
Petitioner's claim that his counsel told him the Court was amenable to the plea agreement 
of two years fixed and two years indeterminate is contradicted by the fact that the Petitioner 
stated that he understood that only the Court can promise any type of sentence.42 Also, when 
38 Guilty ~lea Questionnaire, Question No. 13, attached as an exht'bit to Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
39 Id, Question No. 14. 
40 Id, Question No. 15. 
41 TR, pp. 19-20. 
42 Id 




asked if any promises had been made to Petitioner, he responded by saying that the "State will 
ask for 2 yrs Fixed + [plus] 2 yrs indeterminate, ,.43 not that he would be guaranteed that sentence. 
The Court was very clear with Petitioner that a Plea Agreement with the State was not a 
guarantee that he would receive that sentence and that the Court was not bmmd by the Plea 
Agreement. Papse did not offer any testimony to the contrary in the most recent hearing. 
Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not given knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show that his counsel's assistance was 
ineffective or that counsel's alleged error was prejudicial to Petitioner or that the outcome would 
have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court hereby gives Notice of its Intent to Dismiss Papse's Petition for the reasons 
stated above. Petitioner is granted 20 days to submit additional information to justify 
reconsideration of the intent to dismiss. Papse's Petition will be DIS:MISSED for the reasons 
stated above unless Papse responds within 20 days. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis 7,8-tp.dayof ~ ,2012. 
~ 
District Judge 
43 Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Question No. 13, attached as an exlu'bit to Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for Post 
Conviction Relief. (Emphasis added). 
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